customer.end_session

Sign out: revoke every live session credential of the caller. The tokens stop authenticating immediately — there is no token cache.

• Scope: customer.self.write
• System: no
• Reachable from: POST /v1/customer/commands/customer.end_session — the shopper’s SESSION face, with the customer session Bearer minted by customer.verify_otp (the tenant comes from the token). An operator’s tenant credential never carries customer.self.write; the data face /v1/commands/customer.end_session takes the same session Bearer only alongside x-forge-tenant
• Events: none — It ends the caller’s own sessions in forge_control — a fact about credentials, not about the customer. Nothing a shopper’s page renders reads it, and the tokens stop authenticating on the next request because there is no session cache to invalidate.

Input (JSON Schema)

{
  "additionalProperties": false,
  "properties": {},
  "type": "object"
}

Result (200)

{
  "additionalProperties": false,
  "properties": {
    "customer_id": {
      "type": "string"
    },
    "sessions_ended": {
      "type": "number"
    }
  },
  "required": [
    "customer_id",
    "sessions_ended"
  ],
  "type": "object"
}

Errors

validation_failed (400) · unauthorized (401) · forbidden (403) · conflict (409) · internal (500)